Ethics and Animal Rights (4) - Response to Molyneux

Stefan Molyneux is the author of Universally Preferable Behaviour (UPB), a book in which he exposes a popular ethical basis among libertarians and makes some comments about animal rights. Let's deal with it in this post (you do not need to be already familiar with UPB to follow the discussion).

On page 91 of his book, Molyneux wrote:

"We do not have the time here to go into a full discussion of the question of animal rights, but we can at least deal with the moral proposition: “it is evil to kill fish.” 

If it is evil to kill fish, then UPB says that anyone or anything that kills the fish is evil. This would include not just fishermen, but sharks as well – since if killing fish is evil, we have expanded our definition of ethical “actors” to include non-human life. 

It is clear that sharks do not have the capacity to refrain from killing fish, since they are basically eating machines with fins. 

Thus we end up with the logical problem of “inevitable evil.” If it is evil to kill fish, but sharks cannot avoid killing fish, then sharks are “inevitably evil.” However, as we have discussed above, where there is no choice – where avoidability is impossible – there can be no morality. Thus the proposition “it is evil to kill fish” attempts to define a universal morality that includes non-moral situations, which cannot stand logically."

Molyneux's argument so far does not lead us to the conclusion that "killing fish" is an amoral situation, but only that SHARKS, as machines with no choice, could not be considered evil for killing fish. But what about the FISHERMEN that he mentioned and then "forgot"? They do have a choice, so they are not prevented from being considered evil for killing fish.

In other words, all Molyneux tells us is that sharks can not avoid killing fish, not that "killing fish" is necessarily, always, inevitable for everyone. We can express such an attempt to excuse humans from killing fish like this:
1. There can be no morality where there is no choice
2. Sharks have no choice about killing fish
3. Therefore, we cannot consider evil neiher sharks nor humans that kill fish.

Obviously, the inclusion of "humans" in (3) is completely not supported.

"Also, the word “fish” remains problematic in the formulation, since it is too specific to be universal. The proper UPB reformulation is: “it is evil for people to kill living organisms.” 

If, however, it is evil to kill, we again face the problem of “inevitable evil.” No human being can exist without killing other organisms such as viruses, plants, or perhaps animals. Thus “human life” is defined as “evil.” But if human life is defined as evil, then it cannot be evil, since avoidance becomes impossible. "

Maybe human beings can't exist in fact without killing "viruses and plants", but they certainly can survive without killing animals — as thousands of living vegans prove.

(Note here that Molyneux stopped dealing with inevitability by choice, as in the previous case, and started speaking of inevitability by survival: the shark coulnd't "avoid killing fish" presumably because of a lack of capacity for making ethical deliberations and seeking alternatives; in the human case, now, the inevitability is only because we would suposedly die by practicing avoidance.)

Now, even if the argument that "we can not live without killing animals" were true, it would be just a factually correct claim, which does not mean that it would be an ethically significant one: so what, if this or that is a necessary condition for life? For example, if I necessarily need someone's kidney to survive does that authorize me to take that kidney? I bet not. The question is not what aggressors need or do not need to live, but what is ethically valid.

"What if we say: “it is evil to kill people” – would that make a man-eating shark evil? 

No – once again, since sharks have no capacity to avoid killing people, they cannot be held responsible for such actions, any more than a landslide can be taken to court if it kills a man. 

In the same way, morality only applies to rational consciousness, due to the requirement for avoidability. "

This excerpt only reinforces the first answer given: it exempts from responsibility the shark that kills, fish or people, because he can't choose. But the point is to exempt people who kill sharks (or fish, or animals in general), people who can choose. A moral proposition like "it is evil for people to kill animals*" is still morality being applied to the rational consciousness of humans (i.e. moral agents), who can avoid this conduct — universally because it is evil to kill for all beings capable of avoidance, it is evil for them anytime and anywhere.

*You may find "killing animals" a too specific formulation to be universal, but if that is a problem, note that when Molyneux formulates something like "it is wrong for people to kill people," the term "people" is even more specific than "animals". In fact, the following occurs: the requirement of avoidability leads us to reduce the formulation to the most universal possible. The point is only that Molyneux reduced the universal to "attacking people" because he mistakenly took life as impossible without attacking animals. But it is possible.

"If I attempt to apply a moral theory to a snail, a tree, a rock, or the concept “numbers,” I am attempting to equate rational consciousness with entities that may be neither rational nor conscious, which is a logical contradiction. I might as well say that the Opposite Angle Theorem in geometry is invalid because it does not apply to a circle, or a cloud. The OAT only applies to intersecting lines – attempting to apply it to other situations is the conceptual equivalent of attempting to paint air. 

In other words, misapplication is not disproof."

But one is not "applying a moral theory to snails, rocks or trees". Moral theory is being applied to the actions of moral agents (individuals with the ability to discern right from wrong and to be held accountable for their own actions), including when these actions affect irrational beings who cannot be considered moral agents, but are moral patients, like animals. We would be "equating these beings with a rational conscience" if we were arguing the moral judgments intended for their actions were the same as the judgments for our actions. But Molyneux himself clarifies the solution to this, when he talks about how sharks (as well as landslides) can not be blamed. Given this difference (correctly pointed out by Molyneux, in fact) it is clear that there is no comparison.

Ironically, it is Molyneux's argument that shows itself as an undue equation, equating us with an irrational consciousness, if it tries to exempt us, rational, from responsibility based on elements that exempt the irrational...

All Molyneux has shown is that animal's actions, towards other animals or towards us, are not subject to moral judgment. But that is just not the question, but rather whether our actions towards animals are subject to ethical analysis. The claim that Molyneux had to deal with, but did not even touch, is that "it is evil for people to kill animals," or rather, "it is evil, for those able to avoid it, to kill, included when the victim is an animal."